Fighting Terrorism Read online

  But there is no substitute for the key action that we must take: imposing the most punishing diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions on all terrorist states.

  To this must be added these measures: Freeze financial assets in the West of terrorist regimes and organizations; revise legislation, subject to periodic renewal, to enable better surveillance against organizations inciting violence; keep convicted terrorists behind bars; refuse to negotiate with terrorists; train special forces to fight terror; and, not least important, impose sanctions on suppliers of nuclear technology to terrorist states.

  I have had some experience in pursuing all these courses of action in Israel’s battle against terrorism, including the sensitive matters surrounding intelligence. But let me be clear: Victory over terrorism is not, at its most fundamental level, a matter of law enforcement or intelligence. However important these functions may be, they can only reduce the dangers, not eliminate them. The immediate objective is to end all state support for and complicity with terror. If vigorously and continuously challenged, most of these regimes can be deterred from sponsoring terrorism.

  But there is a real possibility that some regimes will not be deterred—and those may be ones that possess weapons of mass destruction. Again, we cannot dismiss the possibility that a militant terrorist state will use its proxies to threaten or launch a nuclear attack with apparent impunity. Nor can we completely dismiss the possibility that a militant regime, like its terrorist proxies, will commit collective suicide for the sake of its fanatical ideology.

  In this case, we might face not thousands of dead, but hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions. This is why the United States must do everything in its power to prevent regimes like Iran and Iraq from developing nuclear weapons, and to neutralize their use of other weapons of mass destruction.

  This is the great mission that now stands before the free world. That mission must not be watered down to allow certain states to participate in the coalition that is now being organized. Rather, the coalition must be built around this mission.

  It may be that some will shy away from adopting such an uncompromising stance against terrorism. If some free states choose to remain on the sidelines, America must be prepared to march forward without them—for there is no substitute for moral and strategic clarity. I believe that if the United States stands on principle, all the democracies will eventually join the war on terrorism. The easy route may be tempting, but it will not win the day.

  On September 11, I, like everyone else, was glued to a television set watching the savagery that struck America. Yet amid the smoking ruins of the Twin Towers one could make out the Statue of Liberty holding high the torch of freedom. It is freedom’s flame that the terrorists sought to extinguish. But it is that same torch, so proudly held by the United States, that can lead the free world to crush the forces of terror and secure our tomorrow.

  It is within our power. Let us now make sure that it is within our will.

  Preface

  Terrorism is back—with a vengeance. After being subdued internationally and within most Western countries in the late 1980s, it has returned in ferocious and fearful new forms. In the United States, the bombings of the World Trade Center in Manhattan and the federal building in Oklahoma City demonstrated to Americans that terrorism could now strike on Main Street. Internationally, terrorist attacks from Beirut to Buenos Aires were recalling the familiar scenes of carnage from the 1980s on the television screens and front pages of the free world in the 1990s. In Paris, bombs exploded in a crowded subway after nearly a decade’s respite from such outrages. And in Japan a horrifying new form of chemical terrorism struck fear in the hearts of millions of commuters in one of the world’s most advanced societies.

  Admittedly, the modus operandi of this new wave of terrorism is usually different from that of the earlier terrorism that afflicted the world for two decades beginning in the 1960s. The new terrorism boasts few, if any, hostage takings and practically no hijackings. It specializes in the bombing of its targets, and for good reason: The punishment meted out in the 1980s to hostage takers and airline hijackers, and to their sponsors, made the more overt kind of terrorism a costly affair. The new and not so new forces engaging in renewed terrorism seek to evade this punishment by hiding more deeply in the shadows than even their shadowy predecessors. Terrorism thrives in the dark and withers when stripped of its deniability. Yet it is a fact that today’s domestic and international terrorists may be identified fairly easily, and it is therefore possible to deter and prevent them from pursuing the policies of terror.

  I have been involved in the battle against terrorism for most of my adult life—first as a soldier in the special forces of the Israeli Army, then as one of the founders of an institute devoted to the study of terrorism, and later as a diplomat seeking to forge an alliance of the free nations in the active effort to defeat international terrorism. During the mid-1980s, I was part of a broad international effort to convince the citizens and leaders of the democratic nations that this terrorism could be stamped out. In 1986, I edited a book on anti-terror theory called Terrorism: How the West Can Win, which advanced an overall strategy for fighting the international terror which then raged around the globe. Within a short time, policymakers began recognizing that this terror could be defeated, and had to be forcefully confronted. Many of the principles in that book were adopted by the United States, and after resolute action by the Reagan administration and other governments, international terrorism, thought invincible only a few years earlier, decidedly began to recede.

  When I say that today’s terrorism can be driven back as well, I do not mean to suggest that there are no hard decisions to be made along the way. Quite the contrary. The current breed of interlocking domestic and international terrorists is certainly not to be taken lightly. They know the West well and have developed strategies designed to take advantage of all its weaknesses. An effective battle against terrorism must of necessity require a shift in the domestic and international policies that enable terrorism to grow and the intensification of those efforts that can uproot it. Domestically in the United States, this requires a reassessment of the legal instruments necessary for combating homegrown terrorism, alongside the means to monitor added powers given to the government to pursue these ends. Internationally, this means identifying the great change that has taken place in the forces driving worldwide terrorism since the 1980s, and shaping a powerful international alliance against them.

  Indeed, after an interlude of several years in which the vigil against terrorism was relaxed, new forces of domestic and international terror have emerged. Notable among the former are the runaway American militias of the “patriot movement,” whose avowed goal is to prepare for a violent showdown with a “satanic” federal government; chief among the latter are the various strains of militant Islam, which likewise see their ultimate destiny as leading to a final confrontation with the Great Satan, the United States.

  What this new terrorism portends for America and the world and what can be done about it has not yet been sufficiently understood. The growth of terrorism has been accompanied by a steady escalation in the means of violence, from small arms used to assassinate individuals, to automatic weapons used to mow down groups, to car bombs now capable of bringing down entire buildings, to lethal chemicals that (as in Japan) can threaten entire cities. The very real possibility that terrorist states and organizations may soon acquire horrific weapons of mass destruction and use them to escalate terrorism beyond our wildest nightmares has not been addressed properly by Western governments. It must be recognized that barring firm and resolute action by the United States and the West, terrorism in the 1990s will expand dramatically both domestically and internationally. Today’s tragedies can either be the harbingers of much greater calamities yet to come or the turning point in which free societies once again mobilize their resources, their ingenuity, and their will to wipe out this evil from our midst Fighting terrorism is not a “p
olicy option”; it is a necessity for the survival of our democratic society and ou freedoms. Showing how this battle can be won is th purpose of this book.

  I

  The Plague of Domestic Terrorism

  Organized crime has plagued all the democracies. It has attacked business establishments, assaulted judges, corrupted police officials. But the rise of terrorism in recent decades presents a new form of organized violence directed against democratic societies. Making their appearance in the late 1960s, terrorist attacks have afflicted virtually each of the Western countries in an unfailing sequence. The societies targeted have included Britain, Italy, France, Holland, Spain, Germany, Japan, Argentina, Israel, and most recently the United States itself. No country is immune, few are spared.

  This new violence differs significantly from that of organized crime. While the violence of traditional organized crime is directed to achieving financial gains, terrorist violence, regardless of the specific identity and goals of its perpetrators, is always directed toward achieving political ends. Because of this distinction, the scope of the violence of organized crime is radically more limited. Gangsters kill only those they have to kill—usually other gangsters—in order to win or maintain control over specific areas of legal or illicit commerce. But terrorists are out to terrorize the public at large, with the intent of compelling some kind of change of policy, or else as retribution for the government’s failure to follow the policies demanded by the terrorists.

  This gets to the heart of what terrorism is, and how it differs from other kinds of violence. Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends. Though one may quibble with this definition, for example by broadening “political ends” to include ideological or religious motives, it nonetheless captures the essence of terrorism—the purposeful attack on the innocent, those who are hors de combat, outside the field of legitimate conflict. In fact, the more removed the target of the attack from any connection to the grievance enunciated by the terrorists, the greater the terror. What possible connection is there between the kindergarten children savaged in an office building in Oklahoma to the purported grievances of the Patriots of Arizona? What do the incidental shoppers bombed in the World Trade Center in Manhattan have to do with the Islamic jihad?

  Yet for terrorism to have any impact, it is precisely the lack of connection, the lack of any possible involvement or “complicity” of the chosen victims in the cause the terrorists seek to attack, that produces the desired fear. For terrorism’s underlying message is that every member of society is “guilty,” that anyone can be a victim, and that therefore no one is safe.

  Paradoxically, this all-encompassing characteristic of terrorist violence is also its undoing in democratic societies. The effect of fear is offset by an equal and often more powerful effect of revulsion and anger from the citizenry. By its very nature, the inhuman method chosen by the terrorists to achieve their aim disqualifies the aim from the start as one worthy of moral support. Though their professed purpose is invariably couched in the language of freedom and the battle for human rights, there is a built-in contradiction between such professed aims and the method chosen to implement them. In fact, the methods reveal the totalitarian strain that runs through all terrorist groups. Those who deliberately bomb babies are not interested in freedom, and those who trample on human rights are not interested in defending such rights. It is not only that the ends of the terrorists do not succeed in justifying the means they choose; their choice of means indicates what their true ends are. Far from being fighters for freedom, terrorists are the forerunners of tyranny. It is instructive to note, for example, that the French Resistance during World War II did not resort to the systematic killing of German women and children, although these were well within reach in occupied France. But in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge showed no such restraint in their war against what they saw as the American-supported occupation. France, of course, is today a democracy; Cambodia is merely another one of the many despotisms where terrorists have come to power—and where they proceeded to carry out some of the most ghoulish crimes committed against humanity since World War II. Terrorists use the techniques of violent coercion in order to achieve a regime of violent coercion. They are undemocratic to the core, making use of the pluralism and freedom guaranteed by liberal societies in order to crush this very pluralism and freedom.

  The citizens of free countries understand this instinctively. That is why the terrorists’ message has limited sway in capturing a broad following from among the democratic citizenry of the society they attack. Thus the Baader-Meinhof faction seeking to build a new German society failed to win the hearts and minds of German youth; thus the Red Brigades failed to sway the masses in Italy; thus the Japanese Red Army remained an utterly marginal group. None of them ever gained the sympathy of the public at large, and remained restricted to a few hundred followers, sometimes a few dozen.

  Compare this to the much more pervasive network of organized crime. Organized crime does not deal with the advancement of political ideas; it deals with the advancement of corruption, assisted by intimidation. It has many thousands of people on its payroll, and in some countries, most notably Italy, it penetrated all levels of society, up to members of the Cabinet. Graft requires no ideological persuasion. It speaks in the language of money, which is a universal tender, and therefore has wide appeal. This is why organized crime is so difficult to uproot, while most forms of terrorism in the democratic countries are relatively easy to stamp out.

  This last statement needs to be examined, especially with regard to the United States. After all, America is the world’s greatest democracy, and if terrorism cannot be successfully fought there, perhaps it is not a challenge as easily met as I have suggested. Indeed, in the rush of anxiety following the Oklahoma bombing, there was considerable concern in the United States that this bombing was a harbinger of a future wave of terrorist attacks against American society. It is true that the success of terrorism in one place often prompts imitation elsewhere, and in that regard it is not inconceivable that demented individuals and organizations will seek to replicate this tragedy. But I maintain that terrorism based exclusively in America is unsustainable and can be reduced to insignificance in short order—that over a few years at most, almost every one of these groups can be isolated, infiltrated, and disarmed.

  The most important reason for this is the fact that the American public is by and large inoculated ideologically against the spread of the terrorist virus—that is, against the beliefs which motivate the terrorists. Such ideological inoculation can be seen in an example gleaned from a different field: Two former KGB agents said on the CBS program 60 Minutes1 that they worked for twenty years out of the Soviet embassy in Washington, yet failed to recruit even a single American citizen to spy against the United States. The only ones who did work for them were Americans who walked in unsolicited through the gates of the embassy, and their sole motivation was money. This reflects the basic patriotism of Americans and their widespread belief in the premises on which their society is built—unlike, say, many Soviet citizens who did not share such convictions about the Soviet Union during the years of the Cold War.

  The belief in the peaceful resolution of disagreements, in the basic rights of other individuals, and in the law of the land—all these are the building blocks of a democratic education, indeed a democratic worldview, which forms an impenetrable wall in the mind of each citizen against participating in political violence. The possibility of persuading Americans that the indiscriminate bombing of other Americans is somehow going to be beneficial to the United States or the world is next to nil outside of the most lunatic fringe of society.

  This fact flies directly in the face of one of the most infamous pieces of revolutionary wisdom ever uttered: Mao Ze-dong’s theory that the irregular violence of his “people’s army” could not be resisted because his men would simply disappear into the friendly and supportive populace, swimming am
ong them “like the fish in the sea.” This theory may have worked in China in 1949. Massacred, starved, impoverished, and oppressed, parts of the Chinese populace may very well have constituted such a sea that could provide the guerrillas with succor, cover, and moral support. Most proponents of modern terrorism have liberally borrowed this theory, interchanging “terrorists” for “guerrillas,” and suggesting that these, too, would be able to disappear into the friendly people’s sea. But no such sea exists in the United States in 1995, nor in virtually any other democratic country today. The potential sympathizers willing to listen to the cynical theories of terrorist ideologists and collaborate with them in their grisly deeds do not constitute a “sea” but a collection of puddles at most.

  The consequences of this reality for anti-terrorist law enforcement in a country like the United States are of the first order. For even in a nation as vast as America, the number of places in which any given terror initiative may be incubated or hatched is so small that it can usually be identifed with relative ease. Law enforcement officials know more or less whom to keep tabs on, and if they do not, the overwhelming majority of law-abiding citizens are willing and able to rapidly pool their knowledge and share it with the authorities. Thus within a day after the bombing in Oklahoma, federal investigators had literally thousands of leads offered them by ordinary citizens anxious to help. While the accused killer was apprehended by other means, the result of this public outpouring of support was that much of Timothy McVeigh’s network of associates and potential supporters was laid bare to the scrutiny of both the police and the public within days.

  While not every terrorist group can be located quite this quickly, it is nevertheless true that the Oklahoma City bombers are not a needle in the haystack of American society; they are a needle in a bathtub, whose clear water ensures that their chances of hiding and getting away with their acts for very long is ordinarily exceedingly limited. One need only recall the short-lived exploits of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), whose brief spate of murders and robberies received notoriety with the kidnapping of newspaper heiress Patty Hearst in 1974. The entire course of the SLA’s violent history lasted just over a year. They were then forced into hiding and inactivity for several more months, until they were caught and wiped out by a Los Angeles Police Department SWAT team.